We provide a new characterization of the Shapley value neither using the effi ciency axiom nor the additivity axiom. In this characterization, effi ciency is replaced by the gain-loss axiom (Einy and Haimanko, 2011, Game Econ Behav 73: 615.621), i.e., whenever the total worth generated does not change, a player can only gain at the expense of another one. Additivity and the equal treatment axiom are substituted by fairness (van den Brink, 2001 , Int J Game Theory 30: 309.319) or differential marginality (Casajus, 2011, Theor Decis 71: 163.174), where the latter requires equal productivity differentials of two players to translate into equal payoff differentials. The third axiom of our characterization is the standard dummy player axiom.
Introduction
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) probably is the most eminent one-point solution concept for TU games. Ever since its original characterization by Shapley himself, much e¤ort has been put in the endeavor to provide alternative characterizations both for …xed player sets and for variable player sets as well as for certain subdomains, for example, the domains of superadditive games or of simple games. 1 One aim of these attempts is to get rid of the additivity axiom. Young (1985) comes up with the very elegant marginality axiom, which requires a player's payo¤ to depend only on his own productivity measured by marginal contributions. Then, he characterizes the 6 We are grateful to Frank Huettner and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on this paper.
Email address: mail@casajus.de (André Casajus) URL: www.casajus.de (André Casajus) 1 In the literature, the term "simple game"is used both to games for which the worth is either 0 or 1 and to games that, in addition, are monotonic and non-null. We follow the …rst convention.
Basic de…nitions and notation
A (TU) game is a pair (N; v) consisting of a non-empty and …nite set of players N and a coalition function v 2 V (N ) := f : 2 N ! Rjf (;) = 0 ; where 2 N denotes the power set of N . Since we deal with a …xed player set N; the latter is dropped as an argument whenever possible. In particular, we refer to v 2 V as a game. Subsets of N are called coalitions, and v (S) is called the worth of coalition S. For v; w 2 V; 2 R; the coalition functions v + w 2 V and v 2 V are given by (v + w) (S) = v (S) + w (S) and ( v) (S) = v (S) for all S N: For T N; T 6 = ;; the game u T , u T (K) = 1 if T K and u T (K) = 0 otherwise, is called a unanimity game. Any game v can be uniquely represented by unanimity games, ( 1) jT j jSj v (S) :
A game v is called simple if v (S) 2 f0; 1g for all S N ; it is called monotonic if
for all S; T N . By 0, we denote the null game, i.e., 0 (S) = 0 for all S N . A non-null monotonic simple game is called a voting game. Let V si , V vo ; and V sa denote the sets of simple games, of voting games, and of superadditive games, respectively. For v; w 2 V si ; we de…ne v _ w 2 V si and v^w 2 V si by (v _ w) (S) = max fv (S) ; w (S)g and (v^w) (S) = min fv (S) ; w (S)g
for all S N: A coalition T N is called a minimal winning coalition in v 2 V vo if v (T ) = 1 and v (S) = 0 for all S T ; the set of all minimal winning coalitions of
Below, we list the standard axioms that are referred to later on.
Null game, NG. ' i (0) = 0 for all i 2 N: Null player, N. For all v 2 V and all i 2 N such that i is a null player in v, ' i (v) = 0: Dummy player, D. For all v 2 V and all i 2 N such that i is a dummy player in v;
Equal treatment, ET. For all v 2 V and all i; j 2 N such that i and j are symmetric in
General TU games
As their main result, Einy and Haimanko (2011, Theorem 3) show that the Shapley value on the domain of voting games is characterized by the transfer axiom, the equal treatment axiom, the dummy player axiom, the gain-loss axiom, below. Note that we already state the general version of this axiom. For voting games, the requirement v (N ) = w (N ) is void and can be dropped. This may enhance the appeal of the gain-loss axiom, but only if one blocks out the fact that this condition is met in voting games by de…nition. Gain-loss, GL. For all v; w 2 V and i 2 N such that v (N ) = w (N ) and
This axiom demands that whenever the size of the pie does not change one player can only gain at the expense of another one. Although this axiom has some ‡avor of e¢ ciencye¢ ciency obviously entails the gain-loss axiom-, it is much weaker. In particular, it does not demand gains and losses to match.
On the domain of voting games, values may serve as power indices. While it is not obvious that power indices should be e¢ cient, the gain-loss axiom may sound plausible on this domain. But also when values on the full domain of TU games are used as allocation rules, the gain-loss axiom has some appeal. E¢ ciency means that the worth generated by the grand coalition is fully allocated to the players. Yet, it is quite reasonable to assume that the process of allocation causes some cost, say c > 0, for any of the players. Hence, one had to consider values like the value Sh c given by Sh c i (v) := Sh i (v) c for all v 2 V and i 2 N: Obviously, the value Sh c meets the gain-loss axiom but fails e¢ ciency. Therefore, it is of interest to explore the implications of the gain-loss axiom on the full domain of TU games.
Einy and Haimanko (2011, Remark 2) also obtain a characterization of the Shapley value on the full domain of games. The proof relies on their results for voting games, in particular, on Einy (1987, Lemma 2.3) . We …rst provide a short and elementary proof of this result.
Theorem 1 (Einy and Haimanko 2011) . The Shapley value is the unique value that satis…es A, D, ET, and GL.
Proof. It is well-known that Sh meets the axioms. Let ' obey A, D, ET, and GL. By A, it su¢ ces to show ' i ( u T ) = Sh i ( u T ) for all i 2 N; T N; T 6 = ;; 2 R: By D, the claim is immediate for i 2 N n T:
Further, any i; j 2 T are symmetric in u T . By ET,
By (4) and (5), this entails (2001) and Casajus (2011) characterize the Shapley value by e¢ ciency, the null player axiom, and either the fairness axiom or di¤erential marginality. Fairness, F. For all v; w 2 V and i; j 2 N such that i and j are symmetric in w;
Di¤erential marginality, DM. For all v; w 2 V and i; j 2 N such that
Fairness requires two players' payo¤s to change by the same amount whenever a game is added where these players are symmetric. This property is quite plausible because adding such a game does not a¤ect the di¤erential of these players productivities measured by marginal contributions. Di¤erential marginality imposes this requirement directly-equal productivity di¤erentials should entail equal payo¤ di¤erentials, i.e., two players'payo¤ differential should only depend on their own productivity di¤erential. Indeed, fairness and di¤erential marginality are equivalent. More precisely, di¤erential marginality implies fairness on arbitrary domains and is implied by fairness on any (linear) subspace of the full domain of games (Casajus, 2011, Proposition 3) .
While fairness quite often is more useful to work with, di¤erential marginality is less technical and has more interpretational appeal. In particular, it is structurally similar to and shares some of the interpretational appeal of marginality employed by Young (1985) to characterize the Shapley value in combination with e¢ ciency and the equal treatment axiom. Other than its di¤erential cousin, marginality refers to a single player-a player's payo¤ should depend only on his own productivity. Marginality, M. For all v; w 2 V and i 2 N such that
In the following, we show that van den Brink/Casajus characterization can be modi…ed as follows. While e¢ ciency is weakened into the gain-loss axiom, the null player axiom is strengthened into the dummy player axiom. This result does not simply drop from Theorem 1. On the one hand, the null game axiom together with fairness or di¤erential marginality implies the equal treatment property (van den Brink, 2001, Proposition 2.4). But on the other hand, we cannot simply employ Casajus (2011, Proposition 6) , which says that e¢ ciency, the null game property, and di¤erential marginality imply additivity, unless the player set contains exactly two players. Let now jN j > 1: For v 2 V; set
For v 2 V and T 2 T 1 (v), let v T 2 V be given by
This implies
for all i; j 2 T and all i; j 2 N n T:
We show ' = Sh by induction on jT 1 (v)j : Induction basis: If jT 1 (v)j = 0 for v 2 V; the claim follows from D. Let now jT 1 (v)j = 1; i.e., T 1 (v) = fT g for some T N; jT j > 1, i.e., v = u T + P k2N k u fkg for some 2 R n f0g and k 2 R, k 2 N: We have
Suppose,
, GL, and (9), there is some j 2 T such that
Induction hypothesis (IH): ' (v) = Sh (v) for all v 2 V such that jT 1 (v)j k: Induction step: Let v 2 V be such that jT 1 (v)j = k + 1 > 1: By (6) and (7), we have
By (8) and (10), we have
for all i; j 2 N such that there is some T 2 T 1 (v) with i; j 2 T or i; j 2 N n T: We now deal with players i; j 2 N for which there is no such T 2 T 1 (v). Case 1 : T 1 (v) 6 = fT; N n T g for all T N; T 6 = ;; N n T 6 = ;: One of the following holds true: (i) There are S; T 2 T 1 (v) ; S 6 = T such that S \ T 6 = ;: (ii) There are S; T 2 T 1 (v) ; S 6 = T such that S [ T 6 = N: Note that these subcases may not be mutually exclusive.
Case 1(i): Since S 6 = T; w.l.o.g., S n T 6 = ;: Let i 2 S \ T; j 2 S n T; k 2 T; and 2 N n (S [ T ) : Note that such an`might not exist. By (11), we have
where the leftmost equation applies only if N n (S [ T ) 6 = ;: Case 1(ii): Since S 6 = T; w.l.o.g., S n T 6 = ;: Let`2 S \ T; j 2 S n T; k 2 T n S; and i 2 N n (S [ T ) : Note that such k or`might not exist. By (11), we have
where the leftmost or the rightmost equation applies only if S \ T 6 = ; or T n S 6 = ;: Case 2 : T 1 (v) = fT; N n T g for some T N; T 6 = ;; N n T 6 = ;: Fix i 2 T and j 2 N n T:
for some T ; N nT 2 R n f0g ; k 2 R, k 2 N: Let w 2 V be given by
Note that T 1 (w) = fT; ((N n T ) n fjg) [ figg and T \ ((N n T ) n fjg) [ fig = fig ; i .e., (*) w is as in Case 1(i). Thus, we have
By (11)- (14), we have
Suppose
Remark 3. Our characterization is non-redundant. The Banzhaf value (Banzhaf, 1965; Owen, 1975) meets DM and D, but not GL. The equal division value fails D, while satisfying DM and GL. The pre-nucleolous (Schmeidler, 1969) obeys D and GL but not DM. Remark 5. Within the Young characterization, e¢ ciency also can be replaced by the gainloss axiom. But then the dummy player axiom has to be added to the list of axioms, for example. In order to prove this claim, one combines the technique of the Young proof with the technique of the proof of Theorem 2. This characterization is non-redundant. The Banzhaf value (Banzhaf, 1965; Owen, 1975) Sh value fails D, while satisfying M, GL, and ET. The pre-nucleolous (Schmeidler, 1969 ) obeys D, GL, and ET, but not M. Fix a bijection : N ! f1; : : : ; jN jg : The value ' given by
) violates ET but not D, M, and GL.
Simple games
Unfortunately, Theorem 2 does not work within the domain of voting games or within the domain of simple games for jN j > 1. To see this consider the value ' si 6 = Sh given by
In V si , the only non-null dummy players are dictators, i.e., the players i in the games u fig 
For jN j > 1; the value ' si fails E. Now, one may wonder whether Theorem 2 would work in V si or some subdomain with E in place of GL. Since dictators are the only non-null dummy players in V si ; one easily checks that E and N already imply D on V si or any subdomain. So, the question is whether the van den Brink characterization or the Casajus characterization work within V si or certain subdomains of V si . For V si itself, the answer is a¢ rmative by van den Brink (2001, Theorem 3.1) together with Casajus (2011, Proposition 3).
We now turn to V vo and V sa \ V vo , where the latter domain contains those voting games v that are non-contradictory, i.e., v (S) = 1 implies v (T ) = 0 for all T N n S. First note that in these domains F has no bite because v + w = 2 V vo for all v; w 2 V vo : Since 0 = 2 V vo , DM combined with N does not entail ET within V vo for jN j = 2: Indeed, one easily checks that the value '~6 = Sh on N = f1; 2g given by
meets E, N, and DM in V vo or V vo \ V sa . For jN j > 2; one easily checks that the value ' vo 6 = Sh on V vo given by
inherits E and N from Sh. If v; w 6 = u fjg + u N nfjg u N for all j 2 N; then the implication of DM drops from Sh obeying DM. If v = u fkg + u N nfkg and w = u f`g + u N nf`g , k;`2 N; k 6 =`, then the implication DM trivially is ful…lled. Let now
The hypothesis of DM is met by v; w; and i; j 2 N n fkg only if i and j are symmetric in v. Since Sh obeys ET, the implication of DM follows. The hypothesis of DM is met by v; w; k; and i 2 N n fkg i¤
Since v is monotonic, we have v (S [ fkg) = 1; v (S [ fjg) = 0; and v (S) = 0 for all S N n fi; kg as well as v (N ) = 1 and v (N n fig) = v (N n fkg) = 1; i.e., v = w: Obviously, the implication of DM holds true.
Note that the games u fjg + u N nfjg u N employed in (16) are not in V sa \ V vo : Indeed, the Casajus characterization works within V sa \ V vo for jN j 6 = 2:
Proposition 6. For jN j 6 = 2; the Shapley value is the unique value on V sa \V vo that satis…es E, N, and DM.
Proof. We know that Sh satis…es the axioms. Let the value ' on V sa \ V vo obey E, N, and DM. By E, ' = Sh for jN j = 1: Let now jN j > 2: We show ' = Sh by induction on jW (v)j :
Induction basis: If jW (v)j = 1 for v 2 V sa \ V vo ; then v = u T for some T N; T 6 = ;: For jT j = 1; E and N already imply (*) ' (u T ) = Sh (u T ) : For i; j 2 N; i 6 = j, there is some k 2 N n fi; jg : We have
Then, E entails (**) ' (u N ) = Sh (u N ) : For 1 < jT j < jN j and i; j 2 T; i 6 = j; one obtains
for all S N n fi; jg ; i.e., v; v (T ) ; i; and j satisfy the hypothesis of DM. This implies
for all i; j 2 T:
For all i; j 2 W; there are S; T 2 W (v) such that i 2 S and j 2 T: Since v is non-contradictory, we have S \ T 6 = ;: Let k 2 S \ T: By (18), we have
Since both ' and Sh meet E, we obtain ' (v) = Sh (v).
Remark 7. Our characterization is non-redundant for jN j > 2. The Banzhaf value (Banzhaf, 1965; Owen, 1975) meets DM and N, but not E. The equal division value fails N, while satisfying DM and E. The pre-nucleolous (Schmeidler, 1969) obeys N and E but not DM.
Concluding remarks
We conclude this note by establishing a relation between the equal treatment axiom and symmetry on the domain of voting games-the equal treatment axiom combined with the transfer axiom and the null player axiom already yields symmetry. Note that Malawski (2008, Theorem 2) shows a similar relation for general TU games-the equal treatment axiom together with additivity entails symmetry. Given the former relation, Einy and Haimanko (2011, Theorem 3 ) is immediate from their second theorem.
Lemma 8. If a value ' on V vo satis…es T, N, and ET, then ' also satis…es S.
Proof. Let the value ' on V vo meet T, N, and ET. We …rst show (*) ' i (u S ) = ' j (u T ) for all i; j 2 N and S; T N such that jSj = jT j and [i 2 S and j 2 T ] or [i 2 N n S and j 2 N n T ]: Since ' meets N, the claim drops from the following chain of reasoning. Let i; j 2 N , i 6 = j; and T N n fi; jg ; we have
Recall 
For any bijection : N ! N; we have
For i 2 N , this yields 
where the third equality is due to (*) and the fact that for all I W (v), we have i 2 S T 2I T i¤ (i) 2 S T 2I (T ) : Thus, ' meets S. The sole responsibility for the content of the HHL Working Paper lies with the author/s. We encourage the use of the material for teaching or research purposes with reference to the source. The reproduction, copying and distribution of the paper for non-commercial purposes is permitted on condition that the source is clearly indicated. Any commercial use of the document or parts of its content requires the written consent of the author/s. For further HHL publications see www.hhl.de/publications
